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Abstract
Background: There is an extensive body of research demonstrating that trade and globalisation can have wide-
ranging implications for health. Robust governance is key to ensuring that health, social justice and sustainability
are key considerations within trade policy, and that health risks from trade are effectively mitigated and benefits are
maximised. The UK’s departure from the EU provides a rare opportunity to examine a context where trade
governance arrangements are being created anew, and to explore the consequences of governance choices and
structures for health and social justice. Despite its importance to public health, there has been no systematic
analysis of the implications of UK trade policy governance. We therefore conducted an analysis of the governance
of the UK’s trade policy from a public health and social justice perspective.
Results: Several arrangements required for good governance appear to have been implemented – information
provision, public consultation, accountability to Parliament, and strengthening of civil service capacity. However, our
detailed analyses of these pillars of governance identified significant weaknesses in each of these areas.
Conclusion: The establishment of a new trade policy agenda calls for robust systems of governance. However, our
analysis demonstrates that, despite decades of mounting evidence on the health and equity impacts of trade and
the importance of strong systems of governance, the UK government has largely ignored this evidence and failed
to galvanise the opportunity to include public health and equity considerations and strengthen democratic
involvement in trade policy. This underscores the point that the evidence alone will not guarantee that health and
justice are prioritised. Rather, we need strong systems of governance everywhere that can help seize the health
benefits of international trade and minimise its detrimental impacts. A failure to strengthen governance risks poor
policy design and implementation, with unintended and inequitable distribution of harms, and ‘on-paper’
commitments to health, social justice, and democracy unfulfilled in practice. Although the detailed findings relate
to the situation in the UK, the issues raised are, we believe, of wider relevance for those with an interest of
governing for health in the area of international trade.
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Background
Our understanding of the determinants of health has
moved progressively upstream. The immediate causes of
disease, such as micro-organisms and carcinogens, have
long been recognised as acting within a social milieu.
More recently, scholars have revisited early thinking on
the global political determinants [1] and, over the past
few decades, the commercial determinants of health,
recognising the growth in power of multi-national cor-
porations and the globalisation of their impacts [2, 3].
Research on trade policy lies at the intersection of these
two fields, and a growing body of research has identified
its implications for health and social justice [4, 5]. Much
of this has focused on how trade liberalisation and trans-
national commerce has increased consumption of harm-
ful products, in particular energy-dense food and bever-
ages [6, 7]. Some work has also examined the benefits of
trade through increased economic growth, employment,
and food security, finding that the benefits are often dis-
tributed unevenly within and between societies [8–10].
Other work has looked at how the tobacco industry has,
albeit often unsuccessfully, sought to use international
trade agreements to overcome tobacco control policies
[11, 12]. More generally, literature has also focused on
the constraints imposed by trade and investment agree-
ments on countries’ policy flexibility in the area of public
health [13–15]. These examples, and others, have led
some to question why public health is, too often, ex-
cluded from these discussions, and to advocate for re-
forms to trade policy governance, particularly the
conduct of trade negotiations [16–19].
The United Kingdom context
The United Kingdom’s (UK’s) decision to leave the
European Union (EU) brought these issues to the fore,
generating a heated debate [20]. While different views
about international trade can be found in most coun-
tries, the prominence of Brexit in domestic political dis-
course in the UK, coupled with the polarisation of views,
has made this debate unusually visible. Perhaps the only
thing that all sides can agree on is that trade policy ar-
rangements have changed and will continue to change.
However, some see this as an opportunity for health
whilst others highlight several threats. One product has
come to symbolise this division: chlorine-washed
chicken. Some view the existing ban on its import into
the EU as an unnecessary barrier to a product that is
cheap and safe [21], while others view it as a necessary
safeguard against food produced in unhygienic condi-
tions that disregard animal welfare [22–24].
The UK is arguably unique in being a major global
economy that lacks the trade expertise seen in other
major economies, as negotiations have been undertaken
on its behalf by the EU for four decades [25]. This
creates substantial challenges as the UK seeks to negoti-
ate ambitious agreements with much more powerful
countries, including the US, with more experienced
trade negotiating machineries. As set out below, these
trade deals risk compromising health if governance
structures are inadequate.
Trade policy governance, health, and social justice
Who should decide and how, when health and social
justice issues arise during trade negotiations? Who de-
cides what items on the agenda are prioritized: health,
equity, and environmental considerations, or market ac-
cess and corporate profits? The answers to these ques-
tions are heavily influenced by trade policy governance.
Governance guides trade policy agendas and who de-
cides the agenda, in turn influencing who serves to bene-
fit from trade, who is at risk of harm or loss, and what
measures are taken to ensure an equitable distribution
of benefits and mitigation of harms in ways that priori-
tise the most vulnerable in society. Trade policy govern-
ance therefore has implications for health, health equity,
and other social justice considerations, such as the equit-
able distribution of wealth and opportunities, including
opportunities to exercise democratic voice, within
societies.
For example, health equity constitutes social justice
with respect to health, and is the absence of systematic,
unnecessary, and avoidable differences in health, both
within and between countries [26, 27]. In being unneces-
sary and avoidable in nature, health inequities are
regarded as unfair and unjust, and from a normative
perspective, it is expected that reasonable action be
taken to mitigate for, or address, health inequities and
other inequitable distributions of power, resources and
opportunities. Whether or not such actions can be taken
and whether they are just depends critically on whether
governance structures provide scope for any harms to
health from trade deals to be identified, through trans-
parent publication of negotiation mandates; for mitigat-
ing actions to be put forward by those with relevant
expertise, via public consultations; and whether elector-
ates have an opportunity to vocalise opposition and hold
politicians to account for any harms to health they con-
sider unjust.
Yet, civil society groups, health advocates, and scholars
have long noted that trade negotiations and governance
typically provide insufficient scope for health issues to
be taken into consideration [28–30]. Particular worries
have become pronounced among the public health com-
munity in the UK, given some of the stated aims of US
trade negotiators in areas such as agriculture and phar-
maceuticals that they see as posing a potential threat to
health [31]. The UK has had to start almost from
scratch, creating a new government ministry, the
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Department for International Trade (DIT), in July 2016
[32]. However, the DIT must not only negotiate new
trade deals. It has taken on responsibility for various
existing bodies working in, for example, support of Brit-
ish exports and foreign investment [33]. The DIT has
also retaken the competence to negotiate International
Investment Agreements (IIAs) covering, amongst other
things, the protection of foreign investors. The DIT’s
work was, and continues to be, scrutinised by another
new body, the House of Commons International Trade
Committee (ITC), charged with the task of examining
“the expenditure, administration and policy of the De-
partment for International Trade and its associated pub-
lic bodies” [34]. Other Parliamentary Committees also
scrutinise the work of the DIT, but do not have a remit
focused specifically on the work of the DIT.
There are concerns about the degree of public and
parliamentary participation, and the phenomenal exter-
nal burden placed on the UK by the COVID-19 global
pandemic. These concerns have led to calls from civil
society advocates for trade agreement negotiations to be
postponed [35, 36], but these have nevertheless contin-
ued apace. The role of the devolved nations/administra-
tions and the degree of participation they are afforded,
especially in the negotiation of international trade agree-
ments, is also of particular concern given the significant
stake they have in the UK’s future trade policy [37].
Systems of governance guide decision-making and pol-
icy implementation; influencing which policies are
adopted, who participate and decides, and how they are
implemented and monitored [38]. Strong governance
systems are essential to achieving policy aims, avoiding
corruption, anticipating and mitigating unintended con-
sequences, and are critical to ensuring that decisions are
made in ways that adequately consider the health and
equity implications [38]. Whose interests will be priori-
tised and who decides depends in part on the trade pol-
icy structures that have been established and how they
are governed. To understand the health and equity im-
plications of the UK’s post-Brexit trade agenda, and how
and if these impacts will be considered, it is important
to scrutinise trade policy governance [17].
Despite its importance to public health, particularly in
contested areas such as trade [17], there has been no
systematic analysis of the implications of UK trade policy
governance for public health. We have therefore con-
ducted an analysis of the governance of the UK’s trade
policy, from the inception of the DIT and ITC through
to November 2019, examining the work of the DIT,
drawing on the investigations that have been undertaken
by the ITC, with an eye on what this could mean for
public health and social justice. Although the detailed
findings relate to the situation in the UK, the issues
raised are, we believe, of wider relevance for those with
an interest in governing for health in the area of inter-
national trade.
Results
Our analysis identified a number of important consider-
ations relevant to UK trade policy governance, using
publicly available data generated by the DIT and ITC.
Here we present our main findings, illustrating the
breadth and nature of the governance issues that have
arisen. We highlight key findings on potential strengths
and weaknesses in trade policy governance that are likely
to have particular relevance for health as the UK seeks
to establish itself as an independent trading partner out-
side of the EU. We report each of them under the indi-
vidual TAPIC framework elements (transparency,
accountability, participation, integrity, capacity) [38]. In
addition, to provide context, Fig. 1 displays a timeline of
key events.
Transparency
An institution is said to be transparent when decisions,
and the processes and grounds on which decisions are
made, can be observed and the public and other relevant
actors are informed about them [17, 38, 39]. Transpar-
ency is more than simply recording activities but re-
quires that the information about them is readily
accessible, accurate, timely, and comprehensive, and is
presented in a way that is comprehensible, taking ac-
count of the technical issues that might arise [38].
Transparency is central to empowering members of
health, environmental and social justice communities in-
cluding health professionals, civil society and re-
searchers, for example, to understand how decisions are
being made, what is being considered and why, and to
identify potential impacts. In the UK context, transpar-
ency between central government and the devolved na-
tions/administrations is critical to facilitating the
involvement of the latter, which is key to the establish-
ment and implementation of inclusive and coherent
trade policy [37]. Our analysis identified actions and
structures that may either promote or compromise
transparency.
Both the DIT and ITC publish a large amount of in-
formation on their websites and both have active social
media accounts. For example, the News and communi-
cations section of the DIT website contains pronounce-
ments about trade and investment promotion activities,
consultations, ministerial speeches, press releases, and
trade-related legislation, all disseminated in a timely
manner. Other sections of the website report policy pa-
pers and consultations, research and statistics, and infor-
mation that has been released under Freedom of
Information legislation. The DIT governance section
lists the membership of its main decision-making,
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executive, and managerial bodies, including the Depart-
ment’s board, chaired by the Secretary of State, its Ex-
ecutive Committee, and its Audit and Risk Assurance
Committee [40]. Formal hearings of the ITC are broad-
cast on the Parliament TV channel, which permits clips
to be copied and shared, for example on social media,
and are also archived. Submissions and other relevant
material are also published on its website [41]. The ITC
News section is updated in a timely manner, listing in-
quiries that the Committee is planning to hold and up-
dates on those that are ongoing or completed. This
includes the aim and purpose of the inquiry, what the
Committee intends to cover in each session, and the wit-
nesses it intends to question. It contains web links to re-
cordings and transcripts of hearings. Summaries of
Committee hearings are published, with explanatory
notes and quotations from the Committee chair.
There were, however, other processes that were less
transparent. For example, while the DIT reported on
meetings held by the US-UK Trade and Investment
Working Group, including a brief description of topics
covered, it did not publish detailed agendas and minutes.
It has only been possible to ascertain this material from
leaked documents [42]. A second example involved the
Department’s Strategic Trade Advisory Group (STAG),
which brings together representatives of business, trade
unions, and civil society, with its stated aim to “discuss
trade policy” and “ensure trade policy is informed by a
broad range of views” [43]. Its membership is published,
but members are required to sign nondisclosure agree-
ments. Only summaries of its meetings, and not tran-
scripts, are published [43] so it is difficult to ascertain the
evidence used in formulating its advice and the processes
by which different perspectives are reconciled. The De-
partment publishes a lengthy annual report [44], including
a performance register, but it was not clear how this per-
formance had been assessed, nor did we find any recogni-
tion of criticism of the DIT’s work by the ITC relating to
lack of preparedness or adherence to timelines (discussed
later). The DIT has also engaged in several public consul-
tations and, accompanying each, it provided support mate-
rials outlining what it sees as relevant evidence, including
statistics on trade and explanations of specialist terms
[45]. However, it was notable that these accompanying
texts focused predominantly on the benefits of increased
trade. We found no evidence of how potential risks to
health, the wider determinants of health, or the inequit-
able distribution of potential detrimental (or beneficial)
impacts have been or will be taken into consideration.
There was also some information that appeared mislead-
ing. For example, in a press release announcing publica-
tion of summary reports of the consultation outcomes, it
was reported that the Department had also conducted na-
tionwide market research indicating that two thirds of the
UK public support free trade agreements and only 3% are
opposed to them [46]. While technically correct, this failed
to mention that the survey also revealed a low level of
public understanding of trade [47].
Fig. 1 Brexit and UK Trade policy - Timeline of key events
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Our examination of the proceedings of the ITC
pointed to several concerns about transparency by min-
isters. The ITC has been concerned about the lack of
clear and timely guidance provided during the Brexit ne-
gotiations. For example, its Chair expressed surprise that
the government only published the UK’s tariff regime,
that would be adopted in the event of ‘no deal’ with the
EU, 16 days before the planned Brexit date. The Chair
remarked that “It’s unforgivable that businesses have
been deprived of this crucial information until this late
hour” [48]. Later in 2019 (after two extensions to the
Brexit proceedings had been granted), following a ses-
sion on the impact of a ‘no deal’ scenario on trade with
third (non-EU) countries the Chair commented that
“The faces at the top of the Government may have chan-
ged, but the lack of clarity for businesses attempting to
plan for non-EU trade following a no-deal Brexit re-
mains a matter of considerable concern” [49]. When
examining the potential impacts of tariffs that might be
imposed in the event of a ‘no deal’ Brexit, the Commit-
tee Chair stated that “Not providing such important in-
formation is either a concerning oversight or, more
concerningly, an intentional omission … I look forward
to receiving Ms Truss’s explanation of why her Depart-
ment is not setting out the full facts, and to hearing
whether she intends to rectify this information gap in
the future” [50]. Although the Government agreed to ad-
dress this issue, the Committee Chair noted that they
“should not have had to ask for it in the first place” [51].
There were other areas in which the ITC identified
what it considered a lack of transparency. One was the
unwillingness of the DIT to be clear about what was
realistically feasible within the time it had to complete
negotiations on World Trade Organisation (WTO)
schedules and the rollover of EU trade agreements, and
establish a functioning Trade Remedies Authority. The
Committee repeatedly questioned assurances from the
DIT that its work was progressing on schedule, dead-
lines would be met, and policies and systems would be
in place to protect businesses, workers, and consumers.
This led the ITC to advise the government in March
2018 to develop a risk registry [52]. But this was not
established. The Committee also questioned the trans-
parency of data reported by the DIT on Foreign Direct
Investment, suggesting that it was cherry picking [53].
The ITC and expert witnesses raised concerns about
lack of detail and use of vague language by the Govern-
ment regarding its proposed strategies and intended fu-
ture actions [54–56], which hinders transparency and
scrutiny.
The Committee’s concerns about transparency were
sufficient to lead it to conduct a specific inquiry on the
topic [55]. When launching the final report in 2018, the
Committee chair said “Current Government plans for
the transparency and scrutiny of future trade negotia-
tions are characteristically vague and attempt to dress
poor planning up as pragmatism” [54]. The Committee
recommended that the government should “operate
from a presumption of transparency” [54], noting how
expert witnesses had testified as to how a transparent
and inclusive approach would strengthen the UK’s nego-
tiating position [55]. They also commented on the value
of transparency as a tool to reduce the spread of incor-
rect information, which was widespread in some highly
contested areas, such as Investor-to-State Dispute Settle-
ment mechanisms,1 and with regard to the impact of
any negotiations on the NHS. In this respect they argued
that a lack of transparency fuels mistrust and while se-
crecy may sometimes be justified, openness should be
the default position [55].
Their conclusion resonated with evidence given by
witnesses who commented on the culture of secrecy that
they saw as characterising the British government’s ap-
proach, which they contrasted with the more open ap-
proach taken by other governments. This was seen by
some as reflecting how trade had become a party polit-
ical issue, with exclusion of opposition politicians from
discussions. As one witness noted “… it is really import-
ant that individual trade deals are not seen as a party
political issue. Governments may change and what a
waste of several years’ negotiation if suddenly the other
party comes and always rejects it. It is a waste and it
does not take us forward. The idea of trade deals should
be that they benefit the country as a whole. There
should not be Conservative trade deals and Labour trade
deals. There should just be good trade deals for the
country” [57]. Based on their inquiry, the Committee
recommended that certain elements of consultation and
oversight should be made statutory and called for the
level of transparency that applies to EU trade negotia-
tions not to be reduced after exiting the EU. In its 2015
‘Trade for All’ strategy, the European Commission made
commitments relating to the publishing of negotiating
mandates, textual proposals and the text of trade agree-
ments as soon as these were negotiated (and prior to
legal scrubbing) [55]. While the UK Government did
show some movement on transparency in its response
to the ITC report, its commitments in terms of publish-
ing an outline approach and scoping assessment before
negotiations commence, providing reports on each
round before Parliament and publishing the final treaty
text still fell short of EU transparency measures [58].
1Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement, or ISDS, is a procedural
mechanism via which a foreign investor can initiate arbitral
proceedings against a state for certain violations of investor rights
spelled out in an IIA. Health policies have been challenged under ISDS
proceedings, e.g. a plain packaging law for tobacco products in the
Philip Morris v. Australia case.
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Accountability
Accountability exists when one actor must explain their
decisions and actions to specified others with the ability
to mandate remedial actions and/or impose sanctions
when necessary [38]. Clear lines of accountability are
also key to establishing systems and actors within them
who are responsible for identifying, and acting upon,
health and equity impacts of trade policy, and that indi-
viduals and institutions are held to account regarding
their actions in these areas. We identified two main is-
sues concerning accountability; the role of the ITC and
the proposed decision-making processes involved in
trade remedies investigations. The primary role of the
ITC is to scrutinise the work of the DIT, as summarised
by the Committee’s Chair “As the October deadline ap-
proaches, and uncertainty mounts for businesses across
the UK, my Committee will continue to hold the De-
partment for International Trade to account …” [59] and
accepted by the former Secretary of State; “As we begin
to shape the UK’s independent trade policy and define
our negotiating priorities and strategies, the Inter-
national Trade Committee and Parliament will have an
important part to play in holding us to account on our
promise to secure the best possible outcomes for the
whole of the UK” [60]. However, the strength of this
commitment was called into doubt when a newly
appointed Trade Secretary initially declined to attend
the Committee for questioning [61].
During the period covered by our study, the ITC com-
pleted six inquiries, with a further six in progress. How-
ever, parliamentary Committees have limited powers,
and while they can publish their concerns they cannot
mandate that the Government demonstrates how they
have taken Committee concerns or recommendations
into account in guiding their future policies or actions.
The ITC criticised the DIT for failing to provide infor-
mation necessary to scrutinise its work [62], again serv-
ing to demonstrate the interconnectedness of
governance elements, here between transparency and ac-
countability. The Committee also raised concerns about
accountability for ministerial decisions, as when it noted
a lack of clarity about who was responsible, within Cabi-
net, for blocking investments where there were national
security concerns [53].
A Trade Remedies Investigations Directorate (TRID)
has been established within the DIT and, in due course,
will transition into an arms-length body, the Trade Rem-
edies Authority (TRA). The TRID is tasked with investi-
gating “whether new trade remedies are needed to
prevent injury to UK industries caused by unfair trading
practices and unforeseen surges in imports … Our work
helps to create a level playing-field for UK industries …
Once the appropriate legislation is passed, TRID will be-
come an arm’s length body – the Trade Remedies
Authority” [63]. Such investigations, while vital to pro-
tecting domestic industry from unfair competition, often
become highly contentious. The ITC took evidence from
expert witnesses on the various ways in which such in-
vestigations are conducted elsewhere and the account-
ability structures that underpin them. Unlike many of
them, the UK government has given final authority to
the Secretary of State acting on the advice of the TRID.
Greg Hands MP, the Minister of State rejected this view
[64], arguing that ministers are accountable to Parlia-
ment. However, the ITC was concerned about a lack of
clarity on how these decisions would be scrutinised and,
if found to be wanting, would be sanctioned. Further
concerns were raised by the ITC regarding the member-
ship of the board of the TRA, with the ITC arguing for
greater scrutiny of appointments and demonstrable inde-
pendence from government, which it argued was essen-
tial to achieve credibility [65].
Participation
Participation requires that affected parties are empow-
ered with meaningful opportunities to access decision-
makers in shaping policy [38, 66]. Participation is syner-
gistic, but importantly distinct, from transparency, even
though the two are sometimes conflated [66]. While
transparency may allow various policy actors such as
health or social justice advocates and the public to ‘see’
who is taking decisions, how and about what, participa-
tion, when conducted well, can facilitate more active in-
volvement within the processes of deliberation and
decision-making. It may therefore be seen as supporting
a more democratic form of decision-making, facilitating
critical and contrasting voices to be heard and for health
and equity aspects of trade to be taken in consideration
and acted upon in a timely manner. Furthermore, ad-
equate participation of devolved nations/administrations
and local governments is essential to ensuring the needs
and interests of all parts of the UK are taken into account
[37]. This is of particular relevance given that devolved
nations/administrations and local governments hold
competence for the delivery of health and social care,
housing, education, and enforcement of environmental
and food standards, for example, all of which can be im-
pacted by trade agreements. It is also highly relevant
given the government’s commitment that “we must have
a transparent and inclusive future trade policy that de-
livers for all parts of the United Kingdom” [67]. Our
analysis revealed many areas where participation is lack-
ing. Here we focus on three specific areas: consultations,
advisory or working groups, and the role of Parliament,
devolved administrations and local government.
During the period that we analysed, the DIT held pub-
lic consultations on future free trade agreements with
the USA, New Zealand, Australia, and on potential
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accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agree-
ment for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). All four
were launched online on 20 July 2018 and ran for 14
weeks (Fig. 1) [45]. The DIT has also held several out-
reach events, including Town Hall-style meetings and
roundtable events and webinars. These had the stated
goal of engaging a broad range of stakeholders [58].
Consultations were supported by summary documents
[45]. Our analysis of these events and documents identi-
fied important contradictions. Consultations can only be
meaningful if responses are used to guide future policy
and actions. While respondents indicated their support
for remaining aligned with the EU across many policy
areas, and emphasised that securing a future economic
partnership with the EU should be a priority, these mes-
sages did not appear in the DIT’s press release accom-
panying the publication of the findings. Subsequently,
the UK government rejected alignment with the EU and
advised companies that they will have to “adjust” to the
new reality [68]. This is inconsistent with the written as-
surance by the Secretary of State to the chair of the ITC
that “We have run one of the largest ever public consul-
tations on potential free trade agreements … to ensure
that the interests of businesses and individuals are con-
sidered during negotiation planning” [60]. It is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that decisions are based on previ-
ously held, pro-Brexit positions, rather than the product
of stakeholder consultation. Moreover, the government
has since stated that it would not consult on the Future
Economic Partnership (FEP) with the EU even though this
involves a significant trade agreement. We were unable to
identify the process by which this decision was made, a
point which also relates to transparency.
It is also important to note that the consultation sum-
maries were published on 18 July 2019, 9 months after the
consultation processes closed, and far beyond the govern-
ment’s commitment to report on such consultations
within 12 weeks. This delay raises questions as to what
would have happened if the UK had exited the EU in
March 2019, as intended, as trade negotiations could then
have started several months before the summaries had
been published. Another concern, which also relates to
transparency, is that individual responses to the consulta-
tions were not published. This contrasts with other con-
sultations conducted by the UK government, a process
that enables independent analysis of the views of stake-
holders, identification of any concealed interests, and for
assessing if and how the government is acting in accord-
ance with the interests expressed by those consulted. Re-
quests submitted by the first author to release them under
Freedom of Information legislation have been denied.
As discussed under transparency, the STAG provides
an opportunity to bring together a broad range of views.
However, during the period of our analysis, the STAG
had only met twice, in June and September 2019, ac-
cording to publicly available records [43]. When estab-
lished, it was stated that it would meet quarterly, with its
membership reviewed annually. The ITC recognised that
its formation was a step in the right direction but also
expressed concerns about its membership, asking the
government to “redress the imbalance between big busi-
ness, small and medium business, civil society, trade
unions and consumer groups” [58]. These concerns
seem to have been shared by the members of STAG,
with notes of the first meeting reporting questions about
whether it was sufficiently representative of all stake-
holder interests. The government also proposed that
“The STAG will be complemented by a range of Expert
Trade Advisory Groups (ETAGs) who will provide ad-
vice to the Government on specific sector and thematic
policy issues. Their objective is to enable the Govern-
ment to draw on external knowledge and experience to
ensure that the UK’s trade policy is backed up by evi-
dence at a detailed level and is able to deliver positive
outcomes for the UK” [58]. In response to recommenda-
tions from the ITC that appointment to the STAG and
sub-committees should be transparent and membership
reviewed regularly, the Government stated that “Going
forward, we are putting in place a continuous member-
ship review process for the STAG and all ETAGs to en-
sure the groups fulfil their purpose and have a balanced
representation” [58]. However, during our period of ana-
lysis, we were unable to identify any information on if,
how and when ETAGs were to be established and their
membership. It was not until July 2020 that Trade Ad-
visory Groups (TAGs) were formed, with their member-
ship being published on the 28th August 2020 [69]. Of
note, there is a dominance of industry representatives,
including from the alcohol and agri-food industries, with
minimal, if any, health or social justice representation on
each of the groups.
Beyond the opportunities for participation created by
consultations and expert groups, Parliament has a key
role, with members acting as representatives of the pub-
lic. There have, however, been obvious tensions con-
cerning the role of Parliament in scrutinising the
government’s trade policy. The ITC recommended that
“Parliament should be given an opportunity to debate
the Government’s Outline Approach on a substantive
motion before the mandate is set and negotiations com-
mence” [58] and argued for a more robust system to
scrutinise ratification of treaties, including free trade
agreements, that would go beyond the existing mecha-
nisms created by the Constitutional Reform and Govern-
ance Act (CRaG), which had been established when the
UK was a member of the EU. The Committee also ad-
vised that “The House of Commons should have a final
yes / no vote on the ratification of trade agreements”
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[58], reflecting the situation in the EU, where the Euro-
pean Parliament has a vote on all trade agreements since
the Treaty of Lisbon [70]. In addition, where an EU
trade agreement is considered to be ‘mixed’ (involving
competences shared between the EU and Member
States) it also requires ratification by national (and in
some countries , sub-national) parliaments across the
EU before it can fully come into force. Other legislatures
cited in evidence to the ITC as having a vote on ratifica-
tion of trade agreements include those in Australia, New
Zealand and the US [55]. The government conceded that
Parliamentary scrutiny was necessary but argued that
existing mechanisms were sufficient [58]. The ITC also
called for mechanisms to enable participation by the de-
volved nations, as is observed in some other countries,
and local government, including a statutory intergovern-
mental international trade Committee for the devolved
administrations and including participation from de-
volved and local governments on STAG. While the gov-
ernment formally welcomed these recommendations, we
could not identify evidence to suggest that these mecha-
nisms have been strengthened. Ministers did refer to a
review of intergovernmental relations commissioned by
the Joint Ministerial Committee, which brings together
ministers from Westminster and the devolved adminis-
trations, but the review is still pending, with only draft
principles for intergovernmental relations publicly avail-
able [71]. Further, the Internal Market Bill de facto di-
lutes the devolved competences of Northern Ireland,
Scotland and Wales over a range of health matters [72].
Of note, McEwen and colleagues have documented the
limitations of the current system, further exacerbated
due to Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic, calling for a
radical overhaul of intergovernmental relations and
decision-making processes [73]. Reference was also
made to establishing a new inter-governmental Minister-
ial Forum for future trade agreements [67, 74], which
might also offer a means for such consultations [75].
The inter-governmental Ministerial Forum for future
trade agreements appears to have only met on a limited
number of occasions. A first meeting scheduled for Oc-
tober 2019 was cancelled due to the upcoming General
Election [76], with meetings since recorded in January
and April 2020 [77, 78]. In contrast, evidence was pre-
sented to the ITC on the more institutionalised and ex-
tensive consultation of Canadian provincial governments
in recent trade negotiations, including when setting the
negotiating mandate and by integrating them into nego-
tiating teams [55].
Integrity
An organisation’s governance is said to have integrity
when it has strong internal structures and processes
underpinned by a mission and values that maintain high
standards of conduct and prevent conflicts of interest
and corruption [38]. Integrity is secured by the transpar-
ent allocation of roles and responsibilities, implementa-
tion of robust processes of decision-making,
representation and enforcement, as well as adequate
compensation and clear career paths that avoid ‘re-
volving-doors’ that can undermine it [17]. Integrity is
about good management and has connotations with
trust, which in turn can influence the degree and na-
ture of stakeholder participation with important impli-
cations for inclusion of diverse groups and interests,
including in relation to health and equity. When asses-
sing an organisation’s integrity two important but dis-
tinct features need to be considered; are systems in
place to promote integrity, and do they appear to be
working? The ITC emphasised this point when it said
that “Certain elements of consultation and oversight
should be made statutory, to ensure that the system
inspires the trust of stakeholders and mitigates con-
cerns about unchecked executive power over trade
policy” [55].
Integrity was also referred to by one expert witness
from the perspective of its importance in building confi-
dence and trust, among potential trading partners, in the
processes by which the UK plans to undertake trade ne-
gotiations [55]. Wider reading demonstrated that there
were significant concerns related to the matter of trust,
with commentators pointing to failures to act on com-
mitments already made in the Withdrawal Agreement,
including measures to be taken regarding the Irish
border [79].
Integrity involves adhering to commitments, including
those on previously stated timelines. This was an area
where the ITC raised many concerns. For example, in
March 2019, the ITC asked why the membership of
STAG had not been announced despite being assured by
a DIT minister in November 2018 that it would be
within that month. Similarly, on the 15th of March
2019, the ITC expressed alarm about an apparent lack of
progress made in the rollover of EU free trade agree-
ments, citing an analysis that demonstrated that the pro-
gress of many were at “code red”, despite previous
assurances from the DIT that they were on track to meet
the deadline of the 29th March 2019, the original Brexit
date (Fig. 1) [80]. In an even stronger criticism, it said
“In response to our report the Government wrote that
the Government are committed to transparency, but it
seems that the Government have actually consistently
resisted putting transparency on some sort of statutory
footing, despite acknowledging the importance of an
open and inclusive trade policy. I understand that DIT
has the worst performing record for responding to free-
dom of information. Why should we trust your commit-
ments?” [81].
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The ITC and its Chair questioned the mechanisms by
which the DIT would ensure that its policies were
aligned with the UK’s commitments to international de-
velopment goals; “My Committee made a number of im-
portant recommendations in its report on this issue, and
it is encouraging to see that in many cases, the Govern-
ment is supportive. However, the vagueness of some of
the responses doesn’t match the ambition needed to
drive forward a trade policy that is fully aligned with de-
velopment goals. The Government needs to commit to
specifics – including timeframes that it can be held ac-
countable to. Getting this right is important, not just for
the UK but for the developing countries who rely on
trade with us to support their development” [56].
Our findings should be placed in the context of per-
haps the most important development related to integ-
rity which arose late in the process in the latter half of
2020, when a UK minister conceded that the then In-
ternal Market Bill, which as the Internal Market Act
2020 now governs relationships among the devolved
four nations/administrations, would breach international
law, albeit “in a very specific and limited way” [82]. This
created shockwaves across the political spectrum, with
all living former Prime Ministers speaking out against it.
As has been widely noted, taken with its reluctance to
agree with the EU on the level playing field, dispute
settlement processes and other policies, for example on
asylum seekers [83] and involvement of the armed forces
in torture [84], this raises serious questions about the
current UK Government’s commitment to international
law, a fundamental marker of integrity.
Capacity
Policy capacity often refers to the ability to develop pol-
icy that supports the achievement of clearly articulated
goals with the resources at hand [38]. Evidence demon-
strates that state capacity is key to realising some of the
potential health benefits that can be gained from trade
[85]. This is a particular concern given the unprece-
dented scale of work involved in transitioning to the
UK’s new international trade policy arrangements and
the lack of an apparent strategic direction, as noted by
the ITC [86]. Of particular concern from a health and
social justice perspective, is the capacity to identify, an-
ticipate, mitigate and act upon trade aspects that hold
implications for health and the interests of vulnerable
groups. Our analysis revealed two important areas of
focus: capacity within the DIT, and capacity within the
UK more generally. In the first instance, the ITC noted
how the UK was building up a negotiating capacity al-
most from scratch. The DIT has responded by creating
what it describes as an International Trade Profession.
The government’s Chief Trade Negotiation Adviser, who
is also the Head of International Trade Profession,
explained “we are ensuring government attracts the best
and brightest talent by not only offering trade profes-
sionals a clear route into working on trade policy, ex-
ports and investment at the centre of government but
also nurturing their ability for the future through access
to world-class training” [87]. The DIT also plans to draw
upon expertise through the STAG and the ETAGs (as
discussed above). However, also noted above, there have
been many concerns about the ability of the DIT to meet
its commitments within agreed timeframes. The ITC has
also raised concerns about the impact on capacity of
cuts to the UK’s overseas representation and called on
the government to dedicate appropriate resources to this
area [53].
The ITC did, however, recognise that it was very diffi-
cult for the DIT to have recruited appropriate expertise
given that, for most of the time during the Brexit negoti-
ations, there was much uncertainty about the DIT’s fu-
ture role and what would be required of its professional
employees. Looking ahead, as one witness noted, “It is
going to be enormously challenging to go through any
of these negotiations, whether it be with the EU or the
US or other large trading partners. The burden upon
DIT is going to be enormous. Whatever process is set
up has to be as sensible as possible. There has to be an
appropriate balance between consultation and getting
the work done because you do not have an infinite num-
ber of people to do this” [57]. This clearly demonstrates
the interplay between capacity and participation, with
capacity constraints potentially impacting on the ability
to enable meaningful participation by different groups.
Finally, it was noted by the ITC and expert witnesses
that it will be necessary for those involved in inter-
national trade, including all tiers of government, busi-
ness, and others, to have the necessary expertise and
understanding. However, achieving this will require add-
itional resources and support, particularly at the local
level [57].
Discussion
Countries regularly engage in negotiations on inter-
national trade and investment, either individually or as
members of trading blocs. These negotiations involve
decisions that have implications for health [14]. Yet
there are concerns that health, where it is discussed at
all, is often low on agendas or narrow in scope [18].
Those responsible for establishing trade governance sys-
tems in the past might be forgiven for overlooking
mechanisms by which health concerns can be raised. An
expanded body of research on the links between inter-
national trade and health in the past decade means that
this is no longer justifiable. The UK’s post-Brexit trade
policy agenda has far-reaching implications for health
and social justice, and strong systems of governance are
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needed to enable inclusion of health and equity consid-
erations, and ensure commitments to these agendas are
met. Our analysis suggests that UK trade policy govern-
ance is far from robust, with significant implications for
health and social justice.
At first glance, our analysis indicates that the elements
required for good governance might appear to have been
implemented or proposed. For example, a large volume
of information has been placed in the public domain.
The government has undertaken public consultations on
its proposed trade negotiations. Ministers remain ac-
countable to Parliament, although less so than before as
a result of changes to the EU Withdrawal Bill introduced
by the Johnson administration, and the civil service is
strengthening its capacity to engage in negotiations on
international trade. However, our detailed examination
of the work of the DIT and ITC identifies numerous
weaknesses. The ITC reported that the DIT was at times
insufficiently transparent to permit adequate scrutiny.
The Committee struggled to understand the lines of ac-
countability involved in future trade agreements, espe-
cially when they involved other areas of government,
such as security and development. Reporting on public
consultations and market research appeared to be based
on selective interpretation, while key actors, such as the
devolved administrations and local government, who
are crucial in the delivery of services and enforcement of
standards that are critical to health and equity, were
largely excluded and mechanisms for their ongoing par-
ticipation remain underdeveloped. Lack of clarity about
the operation of the DIT, coupled with repeated failure
to meet deadlines led the ITC, exceptionally, to ask
whether the Government’s commitments could be
trusted, thereby questioning its integrity. Building suffi-
cient capacity in a complex area, from a standing start,
was always going to be difficult and much has been
achieved by the DIT since the Brexit referendum. How-
ever, there is clearly much more progress needed to
strengthen trade policy governance to minimise the risk
of poor policy development and negative outcomes, in-
cluding unintended or inequitable distribution of harms.
We approach this examination of the governance of
trade using a public health and social justice lens. How-
ever, in marked contrast to much of the media dis-
course, with its focus on food safety and protecting the
NHS, it was notable that health was rarely mentioned in
the texts we analysed. This is perhaps not surprising, as
the priority has been to put in place a system that can
take forward the UK’s new international trade agenda,
scrutinised by MPs through the ITC. However, there is
no guarantee that issues involving health such as envir-
onmental and worker safety standards will be addressed,
or even how health and equity considerations might be
incorporated within trade negotiations. It has been noted
previously how health and equity remain largely absent
from trade and investment policy agendas, due in part to
fundamental institutional and ideological differences,
with trade policy-making being predominantly driven by
neoliberal ideas of export growth, private enterprise and
reduced regulation, which limits consideration of wider
determinants of health [14, 28, 88]. Notably, despite de-
cades of mounting evidence on the health and equity
impacts of trade and the role of strong systems of gov-
ernance in mitigating avoidable harms from trade [8, 14,
17, 89], the UK government has largely ignored this evi-
dence and failed to galvanise the opportunity to include
public health and equity considerations and strengthen
democratic involvement in trade policy. This under-
scores the point that the evidence alone will not guaran-
tee that health and justice are prioritised, and has
implications for social justice and public health advo-
cates [28, 90]. It also highlights the need for greater ad-
vocacy on broadening the scope of the debate which all
too often adopts a narrow problematisation of the im-
pact of trade on health, prominent examples being a
focus on specific products such as chlorinated chicken
or, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, direct
processes such as supply chains [91]. Despite repeated
calls by health advocates to take the complex interplay
between trade and the wider determinants of health and
equity more seriously, these issues have all too often re-
ceived little or no attention.
Negotiations undertaken within the framework of the
WTO and many regional groupings, such as the Associ-
ation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the South-
ern Common Market (MERCOSUR), are largely
unconstrained by health considerations. A rare exception
is trade in tobacco, where the parties involved can draw
on the provisions of the Framework Convention on To-
bacco Control. This is different from the situation within
the EU Single Market, with the European treaties stating
that a high level of human health shall form part of the
EU’s policies – even if some have criticised the subor-
dination of health policy to neoliberal market logics [92].
Crucially, this requirement is powerful, as it must be
taken into account in decisions of the European Court
of Justice. It was notable that the British Government re-
fused to enshrine its commitment to “do no harm” as it
withdrew from the EU, despite calls to do so [93]. As a
consequence, the British public will lack the legal pro-
tection of their health that they held as EU citizens. Fur-
thermore, interests of UK citizens and residents will no
longer directly benefit from the actions of public health
advocacy organisations that are based in Brussels and
have years of experience in lobbying the European Com-
mission, including on trade-related issues [94, 95]. In
light of these considerations, it is concerning that the
UK government appears to have reduced not
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strengthened the systems of trade governance, despite
the opportunity to do the latter upon establishing the
DIT and despite receiving detailed evidence-based rec-
ommendations on how to do so by the ITC, including in
respect of formalising consultation mechanisms. The
centralised nature of the UK state, with the Royal Pre-
rogative covering treaty-making (including trade and in-
vestment agreements), and the consequent limited
Constitutionally-enshrined role for Parliament, devolved
administrations and local government [37], represents a
potential problem for participation and transparency in
trade governance. The selective interpretation of the
consultation response is also of concern as is the lack of
advanced mechanisms through which to promote mean-
ingful participation of devolved and local governments.
Indeed, the House of Lords EU Select Committee has
highlighted the lack of consultation with the devolved
nations/administrations; draft texts of roll over agree-
ments were not shared prior to signature, which is de-
scribed as “puzzling and potentially damaging” [96].
A further issue concerns the potential constraint fu-
ture trade agreements may place on the opportunity for
regulatory experimentation that the UK could otherwise
benefit from upon leaving the EU. In the event the four
nations/administrations are no longer constrained by EU
standards, diversity in regulation between them (for ex-
ample, with regards to alcohol policy) could be an op-
portunity for public health policy to be informed by
policy learning. However, future trade negotiations and
agreements, largely driven by centralised decision-
making, could constrain the public health policy deci-
sions of the devolved nations/administrations, hindering
the development of diverse approaches and associated
policy learning. This is what appears to be intended by
the Internal Market Act 2020.
Strengths and limitations
This study is the first, to our knowledge, to look in detail
at the emerging system of trade policy governance in the
UK following Brexit, and consider its effects on health
and social justice. It has benefited from the often foren-
sic questioning and investigation by members of the
ITC, but it is also constrained by being dependent on in-
formation that is in the public domain, as requests for
additional data under freedom of information legislation
were declined.
We did not examine the arrangements governing
the negotiation of a trade agreement with the EU. As
has been described at length elsewhere, this is an area
where the UK Government sought to maintain a high
level of secrecy, in marked contrast to the move to-
wards greater transparency that has characterised the
EU – a shift that occurred in part because of coordi-
nated advocacy efforts across the EU, including by
groups in the UK [94, 97]. Early in the process of ne-
gotiating a new trade agreement, the EU published a
350 page draft text of a future agreement, with
Michel Barnier (negotiator for the EU) observing at
the time the UK Government’s refusal to put any of
its corresponding text into the public domain. Al-
though not part of our analysis here, the EU-UK
Trade and Cooperation Agreement as agreed in late
December 2020 has major omissions when it comes
to health and social justice protection [98].
We have conducted an initial documentary analysis,
exploring all aspects of governance captured within the
TAPIC framework. A next step would involve going be-
yond the documents to undertake interviews with key
actors, within and beyond government to build on the
current study which looks at what has been established
but is unable to explore why or how. In particular, it will
be important to look at how trade negotiations are in-
formed by other government departments that may have
relevant competencies, such as the Department of
Health and Social Care, the Foreign, Commonwealth
and Development Office and the Department for Envir-
onment, Food, and Rural Affairs, some of which may
have competing interests. For example, those negotiating
provisions on pharmaceuticals must balance health pol-
icy, with the imperative of keeping down costs, and eco-
nomic policy, which will seek to support the profitability
of British pharmaceutical companies.
Our analysis was also restricted to trade policy gov-
ernance using the TAPIC framework. Other aspects
of (potential) policy failure need to be researched. Ef-
forts aimed at identifying why policies have failed, or
what risks of failure exist, and how to strengthen pol-
icy design and implementation, need to consider “is
this a governance problem or is there another explan-
ation?” [38]. For example, the problem may be a lack
of funding and/or political will [38]. While we have
identified a number of governance issues, the extent
to which these other influences may also potentially
compromise successful realisation of trade benefits,
particularly from a health and equity perspective,
needs to be established. Additional and important
areas for consideration include the extent to which
the neoliberal ideas that guide international trade and
investment agreements and the associated privileging
of commercial interests preclude efforts to advance
health and justice [28]. Such changes will need to be
accompanied by more extensive and robust carve-outs
that recognise the specific characteristics of health
and social services, a review of intellectual property
rights provisions that undermine access to medicines,
as well as shifts in normative assumptions about the
legitimacy of trade agreements that undermine health
and social justice [15, 18]. Such matters, however,
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also underscore the wider significance and effects of
addressing matters of trade governance. Tackling
them requires challenging the long-standing “delibera-
tive exclusion” of non-trade concerns and public
interest groups from technocratic and opaque
decision-making processes [99].
While we focused exclusively on the governance of
trade policy, further research is also needed to evaluate
the governance of other policy spaces in the UK during
this time of radical policy transformation which has
profound implications for health. There is growing con-
cern about the current government’s commitment to
systems of governance and democracy. For example,
the Institute for Government’s 2020 Whitehall Monitor
report on government transparency raised alarms about
the government’s poor adherence to freedom of infor-
mation requests, and concerns have been raised about
governmental departments failing to issue spending re-
ports on a regular basis, and regarding the decision to
change the location of parliamentary briefings to
Downing Street from the House of Commons which
has been described as a threat to media access and
limits the use of mobile phones [100, 101]. Our findings
also call into question how the governance deficits
identified compromise the UK’s fulfilment of the sus-
tainable development goals (SDGs), such as SDG 16;
“Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustain-
able development, provide access to justice for all and
build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at
all levels” [102], and requires further investigation. Fur-
thermore, international organisations, such as the
WTO, recognise that trade should be used as a vehicle
to achieve other SDGs [103], whereas this analysis sug-
gests that the way negotiations are being governed in
the UK could compromise any such opportunities, in-
sofar as they exist. More broadly, the lack of investment
in trade policy governance and failure to create systems
that prioritise health and social justice considerations,
lies in direct contrast to the growing recognition among
global health actors for there to be greater coherence
between environmental, social and economic govern-
ance, which should no longer be pursued along diver-
gent paths [8].
Finally, as trade negotiations are in the early stages,
it is too early to know whose and what interests will
be prioritised, including health and equity consider-
ations. So far, apart from the EU-UK Trade and Co-
operation Agreement, the agreements that have been
reached have been mostly replicating the agreements
that already existed with the EU. Going forward, it
will be necessary to subject them to scrutiny, with
academia and civil society likely playing an important
role as has been the case historically with trade nego-
tiations [94, 97].
Conclusions
Future trade and investment agreements have profound
implications for life in the UK. They will influence the
food that is available, the conditions in which it was pro-
duced, the information that will allow consumers to
make healthy choices, product marketing and how this
is regulated, the price paid for medicines, and much else.
They have the potential to constrain the policy tools
needed to meet future health and environmental chal-
lenges. Norms and values well established in the UK,
and embedded into such policies as safety regulations,
could be abandoned or watered down, instead labelled
as non-tariff barriers to trade.
The question of post-Brexit governance arrangements
also points to the importance of rallying health and so-
cial justice advocacy communities so that, at this mo-
ment of change, health and equity considerations form
part of the new trade policy landscape. While there need
to be appropriate openings in governance structures,
which advocates should also push for themselves, these
then also need to be seized; the evidence regarding the
relationship between trade, health, and social justice
does not just speak for itself, and our findings demon-
strate that there is much advocacy work needed to en-
sure health and equity inform UK policy decisions. This
point also resonates beyond the UK, with the COVID-19
pandemic representing a significant critical juncture and
opportunity for progressive change. While it has raised
the profile of health in a trade policy context, being
linked to the operation of global supply chains for med-
ical goods, what we need is a more holistic understand-
ing of the way in which trade and health interact [104].
At a time where there is a risk that the COVID-19 pan-
demic will lead to a more enduring concentration of
decision-making power in the hands of states [105], the
questions raised by the TAPIC governance framework
remain as relevant as ever.
Methods
We conducted a qualitative analysis of UK trade policy
governance using the TAPIC framework [38]. This
framework, informed by a review of the international lit-
erature on governance, was initially developed by a team
of researchers to evaluate governance in the health sec-
tor and has been applied to a growing number of issues
in Europe and North America, including trade policy
[17, 106–108]. TAPIC is an acronym for Transparency,
Accountability, Participation, Integrity, and policy Cap-
acity (Table 1). Weaknesses in any one of these charac-
teristics increases the risk of poor policy, risks to health,
and foregone opportunities for health gain, particularly
in relation to design, implementation, and outcomes.
Overall, weaknesses in governance can be attributed to
one or more of the TAPIC elements, largely due to
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issues of excess, inadequacy, or inappropriate application
of a governance tool [38]. Conversely, strong systems of
governance can serve to ensure different voices, forms of
evidence, and perspectives, such as health and social
justice, are heard and taken into consideration, and for
potential negative or unintended consequences to be
identified, mitigated, or addressed, and beneficial out-
comes realised and equitably distributed. We applied
this framework using a public health lens, in that we as-
sume that trade negotiations should protect health and,
ideally enhance it, while taking a normative view that,
where there are trade-offs, groups that are already vul-
nerable or disadvantaged should be protected. This is
consistent with the government’s stated commitment to
“do no harm” during the Brexit process [109], and its
wider electoral commitment “to unite and level up,
spreading opportunity across the whole United King-
dom” [110].
Our starting point was the reports and proceedings in-
volving the DIT and the ITC in the period from the in-
ception of the DIT and ITC to the Dissolution of
Parliament on 6th November 2019 ahead of the UK
General Election on 12th December 2019. We use the
latter date as a cut-off as the UK left the EU on 31st
January 2020 and the ITC has only published one report
in the intervening period (until November 2020), on the
implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, which says lit-
tle about trade policy governance [111]. In total, we
identified 416 relevant documents from varied sources,
as follows (Table 2). First, all publications from the
News andNews and communications sections of the ITC
and DIT websites respectively were extracted and col-
lated. Second, all other sections of the DIT website were
checked for material relevant to trade governance, such
as minutes of advisory group meetings, performance
dashboards, and consultation documents. Third, we
reviewed the transcripts of oral evidence sessions and
final reports for all completed inquires held by the ITC
and, where available, the Government’s response. Fourth,
we used a snowballing technique to follow up references
to other reports or webpages cited within the material
reviewed. At the same time, we read widely on Brexit
and trade related issues to place the findings in a wider
context.
Whilst we sought to ensure that we had a dataset that
was comprehensive and relevant, it was also necessary to
ensure that it was manageable. We therefore decided to
focus on the work of the ITC which was established to
directly scrutinise the activities and running of the DIT.
Thus, we excluded material from enquiries related to the
work of the DIT conducted by other House of Com-
mons and House of Lords Committees, and data related
to the DIT’s involvement in some of its inherited re-
sponsibilities, the Prosperity Fund (involving inter-
national development), the Conflict, Stability, and
Security Fund programs, and the Sanctions and Anti-
Money Laundering Bill, as the governance of these
cross-departmental initiatives lay outside the scope of
the analysis. We also excluded the ITC’s work with three
other Commons Committees in the context of the Com-
mittees on Arms Export Controls. Written submissions
to ITC inquiries were also excluded, again to maintain
manageability and because the content of these submis-
sions inform oral sessions and final reports by the ITC,
which were included in the dataset. However, to ensure
the exclusion of these documents did not impact our
findings we conducted a brief review of a selection of ex-
cluded documents. We did not identify any obvious ad-
ditions to the general governance aspects identified
through the data sources that were included.
We applied a deductive approach to coding the mater-
ial, using the five elements of the TAPIC framework as a
pre-specified thematic framework to code the data,
which is appropriate for structured analyses of pre-
defined policy processes [112]. Using a framework ap-
proach, we proceeded by means of familiarisation, index-
ing, charting, and mapping and interpretation [112].
After initial coding of the majority of the data by MvS, a
Table 2 Sources, number and types of documents comprising the study dataset
Source Section within source Number of items /
documents
Types of documents
Department of International Trade News and communications 33 Press releases, speeches, events, announcements
Policy papers and consultations 131 Consultation support documents, policy documents
Research and statistics 33 Market research reports, annual reports
Transparency and Freedom of
Information Releases
17 Freedom of Information Releases
Our Governance 3 Department structure, interest registries, terms of
references
International Trade Committee News 90 Inquiry announcements, news / press releases,
inquiry updates
Inquiries 109 Oral session transcripts, committee reports,
government responses
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purposive sample that included different types of docu-
ments and governance issues, was extracted and coded
independently by PB to ensure that there was a consen-
sus on the assignment of data to each element.
The coded data enabled a systematic and in-depth
analysis of the workings of the DIT and ITC and elabor-
ation of the TAPIC elements. We identified main issues
concerning each of the elements, and reviewed whether
what was reported potentially strengthened or weakened
governance arrangements, again as seen through a pub-
lic health lens. Where we were uncertain, we supple-
mented our analysis by consulting the literature on
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